The 4/8 CAV had several tank platoons actually turn around 180 degrees in the sand storm and turn in to the formation. It is a small wonder that no one was shot up. The 1st Armored Division reported taking some incoming artillery 18 miles northwest of our location and had casualties. As the afternoon wound down, so did the sand storm. At 1800 the Division stopped for the night and dug in. The plan was to stop at night during the movement to contact. I stayed in the HMMWV throughout the night to monitor the radios and catnap. The soldiers were very uncomfortable in their soaking wet chemical suits. Our skin was beginning to blacken from the charcoal filtered garments.
At dawn on the 25th the Division continued to move north in Iraq. Throughout the day we passed through numerous bomb craters and the remains of cluster bombs. We had to be careful where we drove so we did not hit duds. The 4/7 CAV of Custer's 7th CAV was on the Division's right. They captured 350 enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) including a Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Commander. An enemy armored column was reported moving southwest at 20 kph, 98 kilometers away. Also, two Brigade sized units were reported moving south: One 99 km away and one 125 km away. These were possibly from the Tawalkana Division (an Iraqi Republican Guard Division). We witnessed several EPW's captured. Two M-1 tanks pulled up in front of a tent and then three Iraqis came out and surrendered. Up close they has well-maintained uniforms and boots. They appeared to be in good health. Movement ceased at sundown again. SSG Caldwell, SPC Patschke and I decided to erect the tent to sleep in. It was a good thing. That night we had one of the worst electrical storms with heavy rain since we were in theater. This was the second night it had rained heavily. We spent an uneasy night. The wind threatened to blow the tent down on us. Numerous SCUDs were fired during the night. One hit in Dhaharan (Saudi Arabia) killing 12 and injuring 24, 40 MIA. On our right flank the British and the 2nd Armored Calvary (ACR) were engaging elements of the 12th Iraqi Armored Division at 0330. Saddam broadcast on national radio to his troops instructing them to withdraw to pre-August battle positions. Intelligence said to expect persistent blister agent and non-persistent nerve agent within the next 24 hours. I prayed very hard that night.
We moved forward at 0530 on the 26th. The Tawalkana Division of the Republican Guards was very near. We expected to fire all night at them. We reached the Division objective, Phaseline Tangerine at 1500. Division was ordered to proceed to Phaseline Bullet and then on to Lime. At 1630 hours the lead tank company of 4/8 CAV reported two armored vehicles directly in front of them. They went to investigate and capture the crews. The Iraqis moved from the BMP's to foxholes, some surrendering and some moving around. This continued for about 30 minutes. Meanwhile, the rest of the (4/8 CAV) Battalion, including A/40th were halted. As the tankers were wrapping up the capturing of the EPW's, the Battalion (4/8 CAV) and A/40th began to move. SSG Caldwell said to me in the HMMWV that, “We had been sitting still to long with enemy contact that close. Someone was probably watching our movements.” At that moment 4/8 CAV reported incoming artillery fire. I could see in front of the lead tanks, muzzle flashes and orange flashes. My HMMWV was the lead vehicle in the Battery formation and we were 50 meters behind the last tank of 'C' Company (4/8 CAV). Just as I radioed to the launchers and FDC's that 4/8 CAV was reporting being under fire, a mortar round fired from the left impacted 50 meters in front of my HMMWV. 2LT Holder's HMWWV was beside me and slightly behind when his antenna was shot off. I could see the smoke rising out of the craters and smell the cordite. With tanks to the front and right and Bradley's to the left, the only place to move to avoid being killed in our canvas covered vehicles was to the rear. I ordered the Battery to drop back 100 meters. More rounds landed to our front: We knew that we were bracketed so we dropped back out of range. At that time LTC Davis, commanding 4/82 FA, the unit we were reinforcing, sent us a fire mission and instructed us to drop back 5 km. MLRS minimum range is 8 km. We were to close to the enemy to engage them! Within minutes of halting at the 60 NS grid line, we fired 14 rockets at a GCT 155mm artillery battery that radar had observed. After we fired, the GCT battery was silenced.
By this time it was dark and the battle was in full swing. A vicious firefight had developed on three sides. I was especially concerned to the proximity of the battle to our left. It was actually behind us and being fought by 1AD. We were up against elements of the Al Medina Division and the Hammuarbi Division under the control of the Tawalkana Division. The enemy was very well dug in and in great force. The 2nd Brigade attempted to attack and gain ground, but could not penetrate their lines. Tank rounds and TOW missiles were fired repeatedly at the same targets but the dirt berms protected them. That night an unfortunate incident occurred when an artillery round fired by 3/20 FA fell short and dropped an ICM grenade (Individual Cluster Munition) into (the open turret) of a FIST track for 4/82 FA. One NCO was killed. We fired at deep targets in the Tawalkana rear until 0330 on the 27th. The Battery then moved forward to within 3 km of the 2nd Brigade front. As we moved, a flight of Apache helicopters (AH-64 Attack Helicopters) flew beside us in the night for a few minutes. They were 10 feet off of the ground and 20 feet to our left. We all hoped that they recognized us as friendly. They flew on across the lines to exploit in the confusion. Along the Theater front most units were in pursuit of fleeing Iraqis, but the 7th Corps (3AD, 1AD, 1ID) had met with the Republican Guards and were destroying them. The weather turned bad that night with the usual heavy rain, lightening and wind. In between storms the full moon shined upon the battlefield. Even without the moon, the light generated by the battle and the MLRS fires provided sufficient illumination. The unit to our immediate right had dismounted infantry attack their position during one of the storms.
At dawn on the 25th the Division continued to move north in Iraq. Throughout the day we passed through numerous bomb craters and the remains of cluster bombs. We had to be careful where we drove so we did not hit duds. The 4/7 CAV of Custer's 7th CAV was on the Division's right. They captured 350 enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) including a Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Commander. An enemy armored column was reported moving southwest at 20 kph, 98 kilometers away. Also, two Brigade sized units were reported moving south: One 99 km away and one 125 km away. These were possibly from the Tawalkana Division (an Iraqi Republican Guard Division). We witnessed several EPW's captured. Two M-1 tanks pulled up in front of a tent and then three Iraqis came out and surrendered. Up close they has well-maintained uniforms and boots. They appeared to be in good health. Movement ceased at sundown again. SSG Caldwell, SPC Patschke and I decided to erect the tent to sleep in. It was a good thing. That night we had one of the worst electrical storms with heavy rain since we were in theater. This was the second night it had rained heavily. We spent an uneasy night. The wind threatened to blow the tent down on us. Numerous SCUDs were fired during the night. One hit in Dhaharan (Saudi Arabia) killing 12 and injuring 24, 40 MIA. On our right flank the British and the 2nd Armored Calvary (ACR) were engaging elements of the 12th Iraqi Armored Division at 0330. Saddam broadcast on national radio to his troops instructing them to withdraw to pre-August battle positions. Intelligence said to expect persistent blister agent and non-persistent nerve agent within the next 24 hours. I prayed very hard that night.
We moved forward at 0530 on the 26th. The Tawalkana Division of the Republican Guards was very near. We expected to fire all night at them. We reached the Division objective, Phaseline Tangerine at 1500. Division was ordered to proceed to Phaseline Bullet and then on to Lime. At 1630 hours the lead tank company of 4/8 CAV reported two armored vehicles directly in front of them. They went to investigate and capture the crews. The Iraqis moved from the BMP's to foxholes, some surrendering and some moving around. This continued for about 30 minutes. Meanwhile, the rest of the (4/8 CAV) Battalion, including A/40th were halted. As the tankers were wrapping up the capturing of the EPW's, the Battalion (4/8 CAV) and A/40th began to move. SSG Caldwell said to me in the HMMWV that, “We had been sitting still to long with enemy contact that close. Someone was probably watching our movements.” At that moment 4/8 CAV reported incoming artillery fire. I could see in front of the lead tanks, muzzle flashes and orange flashes. My HMMWV was the lead vehicle in the Battery formation and we were 50 meters behind the last tank of 'C' Company (4/8 CAV). Just as I radioed to the launchers and FDC's that 4/8 CAV was reporting being under fire, a mortar round fired from the left impacted 50 meters in front of my HMMWV. 2LT Holder's HMWWV was beside me and slightly behind when his antenna was shot off. I could see the smoke rising out of the craters and smell the cordite. With tanks to the front and right and Bradley's to the left, the only place to move to avoid being killed in our canvas covered vehicles was to the rear. I ordered the Battery to drop back 100 meters. More rounds landed to our front: We knew that we were bracketed so we dropped back out of range. At that time LTC Davis, commanding 4/82 FA, the unit we were reinforcing, sent us a fire mission and instructed us to drop back 5 km. MLRS minimum range is 8 km. We were to close to the enemy to engage them! Within minutes of halting at the 60 NS grid line, we fired 14 rockets at a GCT 155mm artillery battery that radar had observed. After we fired, the GCT battery was silenced.
By this time it was dark and the battle was in full swing. A vicious firefight had developed on three sides. I was especially concerned to the proximity of the battle to our left. It was actually behind us and being fought by 1AD. We were up against elements of the Al Medina Division and the Hammuarbi Division under the control of the Tawalkana Division. The enemy was very well dug in and in great force. The 2nd Brigade attempted to attack and gain ground, but could not penetrate their lines. Tank rounds and TOW missiles were fired repeatedly at the same targets but the dirt berms protected them. That night an unfortunate incident occurred when an artillery round fired by 3/20 FA fell short and dropped an ICM grenade (Individual Cluster Munition) into (the open turret) of a FIST track for 4/82 FA. One NCO was killed. We fired at deep targets in the Tawalkana rear until 0330 on the 27th. The Battery then moved forward to within 3 km of the 2nd Brigade front. As we moved, a flight of Apache helicopters (AH-64 Attack Helicopters) flew beside us in the night for a few minutes. They were 10 feet off of the ground and 20 feet to our left. We all hoped that they recognized us as friendly. They flew on across the lines to exploit in the confusion. Along the Theater front most units were in pursuit of fleeing Iraqis, but the 7th Corps (3AD, 1AD, 1ID) had met with the Republican Guards and were destroying them. The weather turned bad that night with the usual heavy rain, lightening and wind. In between storms the full moon shined upon the battlefield. Even without the moon, the light generated by the battle and the MLRS fires provided sufficient illumination. The unit to our immediate right had dismounted infantry attack their position during one of the storms.
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