The BDE orders meeting was held at the BDE TAC and was concluded at 1045. The BDE resumed the attack at approximately 1200 hours. The situation was still unclear due to the 2nd ACR having slipped to the south of the 3rd Armored Division sector without conducting a proper handover of the battle and intelligence dump.
The 2nd BDE was the lead brigade for the 3rd Armored Division and save for an aerial scout screen requested by the Brigade Commander, was running somewhat blind into the enemy. At 1230 the brigade crossed PL Miller and continued the attack with minor engagements with dismounted enemy soldiers. During the midafternoon of February 26th the visibility began to diminish to less than one kilometer. This was caused by a shamal or blowing sand storm. At approximately 1500 the brigade was preparing to set on PL Tangerine and conduct refuel operations when the 2nd Brigade received orders to continue the attack and maintain the pressure on the retreating Republican Guard Forces Command, RGFC.
Maintaining pressure on the enemy soon brought 2nd Brigade into contact with the ‘B’ Brigade of the Tawakalna Mechanized Division of the Republican Guard. The 2nd Brigade subordinate units maintained contact, engaging and battling the enemy through the night till 1045 the following morning, February 27th. During the battle, the 2nd Brigade was the main effort, leading the 3rd Armored Division attack.
Initial contact with enemy forces came from the Scout Platoon of Task Force (TF) 4/8 CAV, who encountered air burst artillery, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and mortar fire. This was immediately followed by additional mortar fire and direct fire on TF 4/8 CAV and also on TF 4/18 INF. The lead elements reported that the 2nd Brigade had encountered an extensive, enemy bunker complex. By 1715 hours TF 3/8 CAV was receiving artillery fire and the aerial scout screen reported enemy dismounts along the 72 gridline. At the onset of the battle 2nd BDE received considerable pressure from the 3rd Armored Division Commander, Major General Funk and Brigadier General Blackwell to continue moving further into the enemy complex, both believing that we had encountered only a screening force and not a deliberate defense. The 2nd BDE Commander, sensing that the brigade had encountered more than just a screening force, ordered the pounding of the enemy lines with tube artillery and MLRS fires along with close air support from the 3rd Armored’ Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB.) The 2nd Brigade Commander ordered the maneuver units to move up online at 1740 hours and continue to attack the Iraqi positions. Direct fire engagements continued throughout the day and night as the BDE tried to develop the situation. During the battle, TF 4/8 CAV remained the brigade’s main effort and was reporting a massive, enemy bunker complex in excess of 3 to 4 kilometers in length. It quickly became apparent the 2nd BDE was facing a deliberately prepared defense comprised of the majority of the Tawakalna ‘B’ Brigade entrenched in bunkers and prepared fighting positions. The 2nd BDE commander, following the intent of the of the 3rd Armored Division commander, moved out of effective enemy direct fire range as much as possible to allow for the use of indirect artillery fire and air assets to destroy enemy forces prior to committing the BDE to direct fire engagements with enemy armored forces.
The brigade commander ordered A/40th Field Artillery, MLRS to fire on the enemy bunker complex when it was discovered that A/40th MLRS was well inside of the minimum 8 kilometer range of the MLRS rockets. A/40th MLRS was forced to back up several kilometers to be able to fire their MLRS rockets. This movement backwards by A/40th MLRS caused some commotion and concern as several HMMWV’s ‘bugged out,’ but this was quickly controlled and handled by unit commanders. The 2nd Brigade continued to use direct fire in conjunction with indirect fire from cannon and MLRS artillery, attack helicopters and A-10 ‘Warthogs’ from the U.S. Air Force maximizing the superior standoff range of the M1A1 Abrams and M2 Bradley armored systems. The brigade TAC, along with the BDE commander and a small battle staff, were co-located with the brigade’s advance guard and main effort, TF 4/8 CAV and coordinated the battle from their position. The Brigade S-3, Chief of Operations, coordinated all of the brigade’s battlefield operating systems from his HMMWV, as did the other BOS system managers. The 2nd Brigade TOC co-located with the BDE S-3, running a ‘hot’ TOC in a ramp to ramp configuration. Throughout the battle, communication with all subordinate units was excellent, reporting was accurate and operations ran in a ‘clockwork’ fashion.
At 1900 hours the Assistant Division Commander, Maneuver (ADC-M) directed 2nd BDE to push forward to keep pace with the divisions 1st Brigade on its flank. The 2nd Brigade commander tried to explain the situation and his concern about possible ambushes ahead of the enemy bunker complex.
Early reports of interrogations of enemy prisoners of war by the 2nd BDE S-2 (Intelligence) indicated the 2nd BDE was facing a possible armored ambush behind the main bunker line defense. By 2048 hours, Army Aviation helicopters comprised of OH-58D Scout and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters confirmed an enemy armor ambush in the vicinity of QU709253 and actions were immediately taken to destroy these tanks and BMPs. At 2200 hours the brigade conducted deliberate assault of the bunker complex following an extensive preparation by artillery and attack helicopter attacks. The result of the massive artillery fires and close air support attacks left a reported 30 to 40 enemy vehicles burning with numerous secondary explosions visible. During this time period, the 3rd Armored Division commander realized the extent of the 2nd Brigade situation and allowed the brigade to continue its deliberate attack of the enemy bunker and armor complex.
From 2355 hours till 0300 hours on the morning of February 27th, TF 4/18 INF detected and defeated several attempted enemy counterattacks along the seam between TF 4/18 INF and TF 47/8 CAV. At 2354 hours, Sergeant Dillon, a Forward Observer in TF 4/8 CAV was killed by a DPICM submunition that had fallen short of the intended target. A check fire was put into effect to check friendly positions and artillery positioning.
Numerous acts of heroism highlighted the 2nd Brigade’s actions. The acts of bravery included the rescue of wounded soldiers under fire, repair of vehicles under fire and the close range destruction on enemy forces that managed to infiltrate lines near friendly vehicles.
At 0300 hours the BDE commander directed that TF 3/8 CAV give operational control (OPCON) of a tank company to TF 4/18 INF to help guard their left flank from further counterattacks. The battle continued throughout the night with each TF engaging enemy vehicles and dismounted Iraqi soldiers, as well as processing enemy prisoners of war POWs.
The 2nd BDE was the lead brigade for the 3rd Armored Division and save for an aerial scout screen requested by the Brigade Commander, was running somewhat blind into the enemy. At 1230 the brigade crossed PL Miller and continued the attack with minor engagements with dismounted enemy soldiers. During the midafternoon of February 26th the visibility began to diminish to less than one kilometer. This was caused by a shamal or blowing sand storm. At approximately 1500 the brigade was preparing to set on PL Tangerine and conduct refuel operations when the 2nd Brigade received orders to continue the attack and maintain the pressure on the retreating Republican Guard Forces Command, RGFC.
Maintaining pressure on the enemy soon brought 2nd Brigade into contact with the ‘B’ Brigade of the Tawakalna Mechanized Division of the Republican Guard. The 2nd Brigade subordinate units maintained contact, engaging and battling the enemy through the night till 1045 the following morning, February 27th. During the battle, the 2nd Brigade was the main effort, leading the 3rd Armored Division attack.
Initial contact with enemy forces came from the Scout Platoon of Task Force (TF) 4/8 CAV, who encountered air burst artillery, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and mortar fire. This was immediately followed by additional mortar fire and direct fire on TF 4/8 CAV and also on TF 4/18 INF. The lead elements reported that the 2nd Brigade had encountered an extensive, enemy bunker complex. By 1715 hours TF 3/8 CAV was receiving artillery fire and the aerial scout screen reported enemy dismounts along the 72 gridline. At the onset of the battle 2nd BDE received considerable pressure from the 3rd Armored Division Commander, Major General Funk and Brigadier General Blackwell to continue moving further into the enemy complex, both believing that we had encountered only a screening force and not a deliberate defense. The 2nd BDE Commander, sensing that the brigade had encountered more than just a screening force, ordered the pounding of the enemy lines with tube artillery and MLRS fires along with close air support from the 3rd Armored’ Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB.) The 2nd Brigade Commander ordered the maneuver units to move up online at 1740 hours and continue to attack the Iraqi positions. Direct fire engagements continued throughout the day and night as the BDE tried to develop the situation. During the battle, TF 4/8 CAV remained the brigade’s main effort and was reporting a massive, enemy bunker complex in excess of 3 to 4 kilometers in length. It quickly became apparent the 2nd BDE was facing a deliberately prepared defense comprised of the majority of the Tawakalna ‘B’ Brigade entrenched in bunkers and prepared fighting positions. The 2nd BDE commander, following the intent of the of the 3rd Armored Division commander, moved out of effective enemy direct fire range as much as possible to allow for the use of indirect artillery fire and air assets to destroy enemy forces prior to committing the BDE to direct fire engagements with enemy armored forces.
The brigade commander ordered A/40th Field Artillery, MLRS to fire on the enemy bunker complex when it was discovered that A/40th MLRS was well inside of the minimum 8 kilometer range of the MLRS rockets. A/40th MLRS was forced to back up several kilometers to be able to fire their MLRS rockets. This movement backwards by A/40th MLRS caused some commotion and concern as several HMMWV’s ‘bugged out,’ but this was quickly controlled and handled by unit commanders. The 2nd Brigade continued to use direct fire in conjunction with indirect fire from cannon and MLRS artillery, attack helicopters and A-10 ‘Warthogs’ from the U.S. Air Force maximizing the superior standoff range of the M1A1 Abrams and M2 Bradley armored systems. The brigade TAC, along with the BDE commander and a small battle staff, were co-located with the brigade’s advance guard and main effort, TF 4/8 CAV and coordinated the battle from their position. The Brigade S-3, Chief of Operations, coordinated all of the brigade’s battlefield operating systems from his HMMWV, as did the other BOS system managers. The 2nd Brigade TOC co-located with the BDE S-3, running a ‘hot’ TOC in a ramp to ramp configuration. Throughout the battle, communication with all subordinate units was excellent, reporting was accurate and operations ran in a ‘clockwork’ fashion.
At 1900 hours the Assistant Division Commander, Maneuver (ADC-M) directed 2nd BDE to push forward to keep pace with the divisions 1st Brigade on its flank. The 2nd Brigade commander tried to explain the situation and his concern about possible ambushes ahead of the enemy bunker complex.
Early reports of interrogations of enemy prisoners of war by the 2nd BDE S-2 (Intelligence) indicated the 2nd BDE was facing a possible armored ambush behind the main bunker line defense. By 2048 hours, Army Aviation helicopters comprised of OH-58D Scout and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters confirmed an enemy armor ambush in the vicinity of QU709253 and actions were immediately taken to destroy these tanks and BMPs. At 2200 hours the brigade conducted deliberate assault of the bunker complex following an extensive preparation by artillery and attack helicopter attacks. The result of the massive artillery fires and close air support attacks left a reported 30 to 40 enemy vehicles burning with numerous secondary explosions visible. During this time period, the 3rd Armored Division commander realized the extent of the 2nd Brigade situation and allowed the brigade to continue its deliberate attack of the enemy bunker and armor complex.
From 2355 hours till 0300 hours on the morning of February 27th, TF 4/18 INF detected and defeated several attempted enemy counterattacks along the seam between TF 4/18 INF and TF 47/8 CAV. At 2354 hours, Sergeant Dillon, a Forward Observer in TF 4/8 CAV was killed by a DPICM submunition that had fallen short of the intended target. A check fire was put into effect to check friendly positions and artillery positioning.
Numerous acts of heroism highlighted the 2nd Brigade’s actions. The acts of bravery included the rescue of wounded soldiers under fire, repair of vehicles under fire and the close range destruction on enemy forces that managed to infiltrate lines near friendly vehicles.
At 0300 hours the BDE commander directed that TF 3/8 CAV give operational control (OPCON) of a tank company to TF 4/18 INF to help guard their left flank from further counterattacks. The battle continued throughout the night with each TF engaging enemy vehicles and dismounted Iraqi soldiers, as well as processing enemy prisoners of war POWs.
3rd Armored
Division T-Shirts
Iron Brigade – Desert Storm Summary
2nd Brigade - 3AD
2nd Brigade Gulf War Summary - 5
Privacy Policy
Copyright © 2009-2012
