From 17 FEB through 22 FEB, the BDE occupied FAA Butts and finalized its preparation for combat. During the occupation of FAA BUTTS, guidance about the actual G-Day was conflicting. (The term ‘G-Day’ refers to the day upon which the ground war phase of Operation Desert Storm would commence.) The BDE was operating under the guidance and intuition of the Brigade Commander, Colonel Higgins, who felt that events would unfold much faster than we expected. The Brigade’s primary focus was continued Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) training and NBC equipment checks. The BDE staff continued to refine the plan and conduct detailed coordination with the 2nd ACR. During the initial movement, if all went according to plan, the 2nd BDE would trail the 2nd ACR almost all the way to Objective (OBJ) Collins. During coordination, the 2nd ACR Commander indicated that despite intelligence reports to the contrary, the 2nd ACR had not yet seen any indication of enemy forces along the BDE axis of advance. The big concern of the BDE was the marking of its movement axis to the LD and ensuring the lanes that had been cut through the border berm were identifiable to the individual Task Forces.

22 FEB 1991: The 2nd Brigade lined up for its movement to cross the LD. The BDE lined up in its brigade column formation in six columns, with TF 4/8 CAV serving as the BDE center line with TF 4/18 INF on the left and TF 3/8 CAV on the right and supporting elements behind their assigned Task Force. The BDE was on a very narrow frontage of 3 km with only 500 meters between each of the six columns. The BDE plan was to move to and cross the LD with the BDE on line and in column by TF. This formation would facilitate movement of the BDE through the cuts in the border berm inside Iraq.

The 2nd ACR had the responsibility of selecting and cutting the border berm between Saudi Arabia and Iraq to facilitate passage of both the 1st Armored Division and 3rd Armored Division. The BDE elected to use only 6 of the 18 lanes cut through the berm by the 2nd ACR. This choice was made in order to facilitate command and control of the BDE and subordinate units during the crossing. Upon crossing the LD, the BDE would then transition to a Brigade Wedge and assume its advance guard formation.


23 FEB 1991: The 2nd BDE was ordered to begin taking the PB pills in anticipation of possible chemical weapons use by the Iraqi military.

24 FEB 1991: ‘G-Day’ 2nd Brigade attacked in zone behind the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (2nd ACR) screen as the 3rd Armored Division’s advance guard. The 3AD plan called for the 2nd BDE to move forward behind the 2nd ACR, specifically the 2nd ACR’s 1st Squadron, and complete the day with 3AD astride the line of departure (LD.) The BDE Commander had hopes of placing at least 1 TF on the Iraqi side of the LD on G-Day to facilitate the BDE transition to the wedge and advance guard formation. However, as the 2nd ACR pushed north of the Saudi-Iraqi border with little resistance, the BDE continued its forward movement and crossed the LD into Iraq at approximately 1430 on G-Day. The BDE was ordered to continue the attack and transition to MOPP Level II on the move. By 1800 hours that night, the BDE was sitting on Phase Line (PL) Colt and established a night time lager position in its wedge formation. During the night the BDE received instructions to establish a 5 km buffer zone on its left flank with the 1st Armored Division to prevent possible fratricide.

25 FEB 1991: For the 2nd day, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division followed the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment, encountering little resistance and capturing numerous prisoners of war. At 0551 hours, the lead elements of the BDE continued the attack. The enemy situation was somewhat unclear, but the Division was reporting movement of elements of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division and the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) Tawakalna Division. At 0638 the lead BDE Task Force (TF) crossed Phase Line (PL) Apple and continued their attack. At 0805 the lead TF crossed PL Coors. During the morning the BDE received a report that 70+ vehicles were moving into the BDE sector. At 0833 the lead elements of the BDE crossed PL Corona. At 1000 the BDE conducted refuel operations and continued to take numerous EPWs across the BDE zone. The BDE continued movement with the lead TF crossing PL Dixie at 1100. TF 4/18 INF made light contact with dismounted elements on its left flank in the area of PL Dixie. TF 4/18 INF returned fire and the enemy broke contact. The BDE crossed PL Falstaff at 1123, PL Vegas at 1137 and PL Light at 1345 with little to no resistance except for the collecting of numerous EPWs enroute. The BDE approached PL Saigon at approximately at 1445 and continued to take Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs.) The BDE sat on PL Lonestar at 1630 and conducted refueling operations. 2nd Brigade prepared for a night lager after having taken 69 EPWs throughout the day. This unexpected capitulation of enemy forces without a fight caused the impression at higher levels that the attack was transitioning to an exploitation. At 2200 hours, the BDE received a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) to pass through the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment and continue the attack through Objective (OBJ) Collins to seize OBJs Minden and Dorset. This FRAGO produced an orientation more to the east rather than the northeast as the BDE moved forward. Although 3rd Armored Division Headquarters had not issued guidance about a possible change in direction, the BDE Staff had war-gamed this possibility and was prepared for this action with a fully prepared course of action. The 2nd BDE – 3AD would continue leading the attack for the 3rd Armored Division. At this point, the 1st BDE – 3AD would be moving up on 2nd BDE’s right flank and tie in with TF 3/8 CAV. This placed both 2nd BDE and 1st BDE on line, from left to right, in the 3AD zone and would leave 3rd BDE as the Division reserve, trailing the 2nd BDE. During the night, the BDE Staff conducted a detailed planning cycle to complete their course of action and issue it to the subordinate units. Additionally, the BDE Staff attempted to coordinate with the 2nd ACR for the forward passage of lines. The 2nd ACR replied that they were not aware of our passage of lines and must receive their instructions from the VII Corps Commander. With an uneasy feeling about the impending passage of lines and battle handover to the 2nd BDE, the BDE continued to work out a FRAGO to issue to subordinate units in the morning.

26 FEB 1991: In the morning, the 2nd ACR slipped to the southeast, out of 3rd Armored Division’s sector and 2nd BDE continued the attack to the east. The BDE moved forward during the morning, maintaining contact on its flank with the 1st Armored Division and the 1st BDE – 3AD.

The 2nd BDE attacked at 0600, crossing PL Smash at 0824. At 0945, the BDE halted at PL Cairo for an hour to allow the 1st BDE to come on line and issue a FRAGO to units concerning information received during the night. During this time period, the Division issued a verbal FRAGO to the BDE; however, it had minimal impact as the FRAGO was in sync with the BDE plan that had anticipated Division Headquarters future actions.