The BDE combat wedge formation was approximately 10km across and extended roughly 25km in depth due to the number of attachments and vehicles in the BDE formation. The Brigade Commander intended to place tracked vehicles on the outside of the formation while positioning soft-skinned vehicles inside the wedge formation, providing them with security. Additionally, the Brigade Commander directed that no wheeled vehicles would be forward of unit combat trains (combat unit support vehicles) after crossing the Line of Departure (LD).
In preparation for the conduct of combat operations, the BDE conducted several rehearsals of the wedge formation, movement and immediate action drills. These rehearsals paid great dividends during the actual fight with the enemy. Planning guidance for the entire operation was to maintain an all-around security posture, both on the move and during halts.
The 2nd BDE attack plan was simple. The 2nd BDE would lead the 3rd Armored Division (3AD) attack in a BDE wedge formation with TF 4/8 CAV (call sign ‘Stallions’) leading the BDE as the advance guard. (*3AD 1st BDE would be on the 2nd BDE left flank and the 3AD 3rd BDE would be on the 2nd BDE right flank, tied in with the 1st Calvary Division (1CAV) on the 3AD right flank.) On 4/8 CAV’s left flank was TF 4/18 INF (call sign ‘Vanguards’) and to the right of 4/8 CAV was 3/8 CAV (call sign ‘Mustangs’). Each battalion TF had a field artillery battery from 4/82 FA (call sign ‘Dragons’) travelling in its formation, providing direct fire support. Positioned directly behind 4/8 CAV, the BDE advance guard, was the 3rd Armored Division’s only MLRS battery, A/40th FA, MLRS (call sign ‘Deep Strike!’) The positioning of A/40th FA so far forward, with the leading 3AD TF, was completely contrary to usual U.S. Field Artillery employment doctrine. The BDE Commander wanted to have available, the capability of targeting enemy formations well to the front of 3AD and even be able to engage targets in front of the VII Corps screening unit, 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (2nd ACR.) Given this TF organization and distribution of assets, the BDE was prepared to react to contact using one of several immediate action drills, i.e. action right, action left or action front, each requiring on of the flank units to conduct counterattacks into the flank of an enemy formation. The intent was to use 4/8 CAV, an M1A1 Abrams tank battalion, as the hammer in as many situations as possible against the anvil of the BDE, 4/18 INF on the left flank and 3/8 CAV on the right flank.
The original division attack plan called for a 24-48 hour continuous attack to seize Objective (OBJ) Collins (approximately 220km inside of Iraq) and then a 72-96 hour planning cycle to prepare for the deliberate destruction of the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). In hind sight, the time estimate for reaching OBJ Collins was fairly accurate. Due to unexpected success and a collapsing Iraqi defense, the 2nd BDE engaged the RGFC early and began to destroy them as part of the movement to contact.
In preparation for the conduct of combat operations, the BDE conducted several rehearsals of the wedge formation, movement and immediate action drills. These rehearsals paid great dividends during the actual fight with the enemy. Planning guidance for the entire operation was to maintain an all-around security posture, both on the move and during halts.
The 2nd BDE attack plan was simple. The 2nd BDE would lead the 3rd Armored Division (3AD) attack in a BDE wedge formation with TF 4/8 CAV (call sign ‘Stallions’) leading the BDE as the advance guard. (*3AD 1st BDE would be on the 2nd BDE left flank and the 3AD 3rd BDE would be on the 2nd BDE right flank, tied in with the 1st Calvary Division (1CAV) on the 3AD right flank.) On 4/8 CAV’s left flank was TF 4/18 INF (call sign ‘Vanguards’) and to the right of 4/8 CAV was 3/8 CAV (call sign ‘Mustangs’). Each battalion TF had a field artillery battery from 4/82 FA (call sign ‘Dragons’) travelling in its formation, providing direct fire support. Positioned directly behind 4/8 CAV, the BDE advance guard, was the 3rd Armored Division’s only MLRS battery, A/40th FA, MLRS (call sign ‘Deep Strike!’) The positioning of A/40th FA so far forward, with the leading 3AD TF, was completely contrary to usual U.S. Field Artillery employment doctrine. The BDE Commander wanted to have available, the capability of targeting enemy formations well to the front of 3AD and even be able to engage targets in front of the VII Corps screening unit, 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (2nd ACR.) Given this TF organization and distribution of assets, the BDE was prepared to react to contact using one of several immediate action drills, i.e. action right, action left or action front, each requiring on of the flank units to conduct counterattacks into the flank of an enemy formation. The intent was to use 4/8 CAV, an M1A1 Abrams tank battalion, as the hammer in as many situations as possible against the anvil of the BDE, 4/18 INF on the left flank and 3/8 CAV on the right flank.
The original division attack plan called for a 24-48 hour continuous attack to seize Objective (OBJ) Collins (approximately 220km inside of Iraq) and then a 72-96 hour planning cycle to prepare for the deliberate destruction of the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). In hind sight, the time estimate for reaching OBJ Collins was fairly accurate. Due to unexpected success and a collapsing Iraqi defense, the 2nd BDE engaged the RGFC early and began to destroy them as part of the movement to contact.
The 3rd Armored Division plan called for the 2nd BDE to begin movement from TAA Henry to FAA Butts at G-6 (six days before the ground invasion of Iraq). On 10 FEB 1991, 2nd BDE was alerted the G-Day sequence had started. The BDE was now four days away from movement.
12 FEB 1991: The BDE staff briefed the last minute changes to the BDE operation order and prepared to send out their quartering parties.
13 FEB 1991: The BDE received verbal approval to send forward their quartering parties. The Brigade Commander’s decision to have the quartering parties prepared to depart on brief notice made frequent and disjointed instruction from 3AD headquarters transparent to the battalions.
14 FEB 1991: The BDE began forming for the movement to FAA Butts. The BDE formed in a BDE column with all units in column formation behind the lead attack battalions with TF 4/18 INF on the left flank, TF 4/8 CAV in the center and TF 3/8 CAV on the right flank.
At 1300 the BDE received reports of SCUD missile attacks on Hafar Al Batin and possible ground attacks along the Wadi Al Batin. At 1320, the BDE Commander ordered the Task Forces (TFs) to form their combat wedge formations to protect against the possible ground attack. It was later learned that the SCUD missile attacks were a reality, but the ground attack turned out to be a false report.
15 FEB 1991: The 2nd BDE continued movement to FAA Butts. This was part of the complicated VII Corps wide deception operation to avoid the Iraqi human intelligence network by going south of Hafar Al Batin. This movement was coordinated with the 1st Armored Division shift from the east to the west, across the 3rd Armored Division line of march.
The 2nd Brigade sustained its first casualty when First Sergeant (1SG) Sanders, the ‘Top’ NCO of Service Battery 4/82 FA was discovered dead, having been run over by an M985 HEMTT during the night. The BDE movement across the Wadi Al Batin went smooth, with each TF having established an Advance Party to meet them as the TFs closed on the crossing sites through the Wadi Al Batin. Movement through the Wadi Al Batin was slow and a strong wind created a shamal (sand storm). The shamal slowed the BDE movement, but did not cause any significant problems for the combat units. The only exception was when the R3 became separated during the movement and the BDE column became extended to almost 50 km in depth. By 1500 the BDE was closing in on Assembly Area (AA) Iron, located north of Wadi Al Batin and south of the Tapline road.
16 FEB 1991: The BDE departed Assembly Area (AA) Iron in its brigade column formation and continued to move towards the Tapline Road (a paved road stretching from the Arabian Sea in the east all the way to Jordan in the west) and Forward Assembly Area (FAA) Butts. The BDE began crossing Tapline Road at 1100. The crossing of the road was a division controlled exercise designed to replicate the crossing of the border berm during the ground attack. Movement went well despite the confusion created by the 2nd ACR having difficulty locating the crossing points of Tapline Road. At 1800 the BDE had completed its link-up with the quartering party and closed into FAA Butts. The BDE was occupying the FAA in a defensive manner with TF 4/8 CAV in the north of the BDE sector, approximately 10 km behind the 1st Squadron of the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment. TF 4/18 INF was on the BDE left and TF 3/8 CAV was positioned on the BDE right flank. The R3 package was positioned in the center of the defensive formation. Final preparations for combat began immediately upon occupation of FAA Butts.
12 FEB 1991: The BDE staff briefed the last minute changes to the BDE operation order and prepared to send out their quartering parties.
13 FEB 1991: The BDE received verbal approval to send forward their quartering parties. The Brigade Commander’s decision to have the quartering parties prepared to depart on brief notice made frequent and disjointed instruction from 3AD headquarters transparent to the battalions.
14 FEB 1991: The BDE began forming for the movement to FAA Butts. The BDE formed in a BDE column with all units in column formation behind the lead attack battalions with TF 4/18 INF on the left flank, TF 4/8 CAV in the center and TF 3/8 CAV on the right flank.
At 1300 the BDE received reports of SCUD missile attacks on Hafar Al Batin and possible ground attacks along the Wadi Al Batin. At 1320, the BDE Commander ordered the Task Forces (TFs) to form their combat wedge formations to protect against the possible ground attack. It was later learned that the SCUD missile attacks were a reality, but the ground attack turned out to be a false report.
15 FEB 1991: The 2nd BDE continued movement to FAA Butts. This was part of the complicated VII Corps wide deception operation to avoid the Iraqi human intelligence network by going south of Hafar Al Batin. This movement was coordinated with the 1st Armored Division shift from the east to the west, across the 3rd Armored Division line of march.
The 2nd Brigade sustained its first casualty when First Sergeant (1SG) Sanders, the ‘Top’ NCO of Service Battery 4/82 FA was discovered dead, having been run over by an M985 HEMTT during the night. The BDE movement across the Wadi Al Batin went smooth, with each TF having established an Advance Party to meet them as the TFs closed on the crossing sites through the Wadi Al Batin. Movement through the Wadi Al Batin was slow and a strong wind created a shamal (sand storm). The shamal slowed the BDE movement, but did not cause any significant problems for the combat units. The only exception was when the R3 became separated during the movement and the BDE column became extended to almost 50 km in depth. By 1500 the BDE was closing in on Assembly Area (AA) Iron, located north of Wadi Al Batin and south of the Tapline road.
16 FEB 1991: The BDE departed Assembly Area (AA) Iron in its brigade column formation and continued to move towards the Tapline Road (a paved road stretching from the Arabian Sea in the east all the way to Jordan in the west) and Forward Assembly Area (FAA) Butts. The BDE began crossing Tapline Road at 1100. The crossing of the road was a division controlled exercise designed to replicate the crossing of the border berm during the ground attack. Movement went well despite the confusion created by the 2nd ACR having difficulty locating the crossing points of Tapline Road. At 1800 the BDE had completed its link-up with the quartering party and closed into FAA Butts. The BDE was occupying the FAA in a defensive manner with TF 4/8 CAV in the north of the BDE sector, approximately 10 km behind the 1st Squadron of the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment. TF 4/18 INF was on the BDE left and TF 3/8 CAV was positioned on the BDE right flank. The R3 package was positioned in the center of the defensive formation. Final preparations for combat began immediately upon occupation of FAA Butts.
Movement to Forward Assembly Area (FAA) Butts
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