Due to a shortage of 120mm TPT ammunition, many of the Gunnery exercises were dry runs and rehearsals of Crew, Platoon and Company battle drills. This effort was headed by Captain (CPT) Ralph Zimmerman and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Fortune. The BDE Commander’s intent was to provide M1A1 Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) crews with confidence in, and a certain level of comfort with, their vehicles, prior to crossing the Line of Departure (LD).

On 7 February 1991 a major change in the BDE staff occurred. Major Chip Wentz departed Saudi Arabia to attend the Pre-Command Course and assume command of a battalion in the U.S. Major Edward Martinez assumed the duties as the BDE S-3 (Operations). The BDE staff accepted the change in a competent and professional manner, as did the subordinate battalions, producing minimal disruptions. On 9 February 1991 3AD conducted its threat and final rehearsal of the movement from the LD to Objective (OBJ) Collins. This rehearsal concluded with one of the three standard action drills, an Action Front. The lessons learned from this rehearsal by the Battalion Commanders and staff proved integral to subsequent success of the 2nd BDE (Iron Brigade) in battle.

As previously mentioned, the BDE had deployed to Saudi Arabia without Engineer assets. Once the BDE closed on TAA Henry, Engineer support was provided to the BDE. The engineer support came from Task Force (TF) 23rd Engineer Battalion. The TF 23rd ENG was a composite battalion, consisting of the 23rd ENG Battalion Headquarters (HQ), ‘A’ Company/23rd ENG, ‘D’ Company/23rd ENG and ‘A’ Company/12th ENG Regiment.

Of concern to the BDE was the possibility of a major breaching operation. Each Task Force (TF) was provided engineer assets to conduct an in-stride breach. It was decided that if a more deliberate breaching operation was required, TF 4/18 INF would assume the role of the breaching TF. Task Force 4/8 CAV would be the support for the breaching TF. The 3/8 CAV would be the assault battalion. Task Force 4/18 INF was given Operational Control (OPCON) of A/23rd ENG, along with the majority of the ACE’s, CVE’s and AVLM’s.

The 23rd ENG also received two mine rakes for mounting on the CEV’s. These were full width rakes and worked well in the sand during training exercises in TAA Henry. The BDE also received eight mine plows and four mine rollers which were mounted to tanks from each TF while the rollers themselves, traveled with the BDE R3 (support assets and units). The rollers would be brought forward of needed. D/23rd ENG was used throughout the entire deployment in a nonstandard role. D/23rd ENG was assigned to the BDE R3 with the mission to provide security, assist in mobility and with Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) control and to mark the BDE Main Supply Route (MSR).

The BDE MSR was marked by D/23rd ENG during the attack with pickets every 250 meters for approximately 250 km from FAA Butts to OBJ Dorset. This was cited as a major factor in preventing vehicles from becoming lost while bringing logistics packs back and forth from the logistics base to the BDE Front Line of Troops (FLOT).

During occupation of TAA Henry the 2nd BDE had responsibility for reaction to a preemptive attack by Iraqi forces, most likely elements of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division or the 10th Armored Division. The BDE developed ‘Operation Desert Guard’ and had the plans in place by January 12, 1991. It was anticipated that any attack would be preceded by heavy air attacks, surface to surface missiles and probable terrorist operations against 3AD forces. We anticipated as little as 12 hours’ notice prior to an Iraqi preemptive attack. The most likely objective was believed to be Hafar Al Batin and King Khalid Military City (KKMC). The BDE had the mission to block the Main Supply Route (MSR) Sultan and defeat Iraqi forces within the VII Corps sector or follow and support the 1st Armored Division (1AD) in Corps sector. The 2nd BDE developed three contingencies for this plan based on the Commander’s guidance of being prepared to fight now, with what the BDE has on the ground at this time. All soldiers must be prepared to fight as infantry and defend long enough to allow our air assets to defeat the enemy attack. This operation was designed to meet an attack by Iraqi forces principally down the Wadi Al Batin (an ancient river bed, now dry, that led from the Northern Saudi Arabian plateau to the Euphrates River in Southeastern Iraq.) The BDE staff devoted considerable time and effort, as did each battalion/task force, preparing for this mission. The principal force in this operation was TF 4/18 INF.

Contingency Alpha: was to occupy a battalion position and block an advance along MRS Sultan, protect KKMC and allow no penetration of their position.

Contingency Bravo: had TF 4/18 INF performing a follow and support mission to 1AD as part of a VII Corps directed counterattack to defeat Iraqi forces.

Contingency Charlie: had TF 4/18 INF defending the 3AD TAC from possible attack.

The 3rd Armored Division attack plan, Operation Desert Spear, called for the 2nd BDE to move from TAA Henry to FAA Butts at G-6 (six days before the ground invasion of Iraq.) Throughout the entire preparation for combat, the BDE staff continued to refine and prepare their battle plans in support of the 3AD plan. On several occasions, Battalion Commanders and their respective staffs were called to briefings to prepare for the ground offensive. Development of a decision support template for the BDE’s attack plan to Operation Desert Spear took place as a coordinated staff effort during the occupation of TAA Henry. Prior to the attack on Iraqi forces, the BDE S-2 (Intelligence Section) templated possible Iraqi counterattack options. (Due to the quick collapse of the enemy’s situation during the ground war, none of these contingencies were utilized.)

In the development of the BDE maneuver plan, the staff realized that unique navigational graphics would be required, some more restrictive than previously used. Due to the difficulty of navigation, battalions were issued graphics that were unlike any that had been previously issued. Units were issued a series of navigational points (check points) to orient their movement. Phase lines (PL) were generally drawn along gridlines every 10km due to the lack of identifiable terrain features.