Operation Desert Storm Summary

On 8 November 1990, 2nd Brigade (BDE), comprised of the 4th Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment (4/18 INF), equipped with M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the 3rd Battalion 8th Calvary Regiment – Armor (3/8 CAV) and 4th Battalion 8th Calvary Regiment – Armor (4/8 CAV) both equipped with M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks as part of the 3rd Armored Division (3AD) stationed in Gelnhausen, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was alerted for deployment to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Shield. At the time of the alert, the 2nd BDE was in the process of inactivating as part of the Conventional Forces European Reduction (CFE) process.

The 2nd BDE had a habitual association with the 4th Battalion 82nd Field Artillery Regiment (4/82 FA), the 45th Forward Support Battalion (45th FSB), the 317th Engineer Battalion (317th ENG) and the 3rd Battalion 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (3/5 ADA). Due to inactivation activities in accordance with the CFE, many of the associated units were inactivating or had inactivated. Subsequently, the 317th ENG and 3/5 ADA assets did not deploy with the 2nd BDE Task Force (TF). Upon notification for deployment, the BDE began a pre-deployment training program. The focus of the program was Nuclear Biological & Chemical (NBC) training and preparation for desert operations: A completely different type mission requirement than what the BDE had been preparing for in the European scenario.

On order, 2nd Brigade – 3rd Armored Division moves to, secures and defends assigned TAA and FAA. Attack in zone as the 3rd Armored Division Advance Guard to destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command and defend Northern Kuwait.

The deployment of the 2nd BDE was the responsibility of the BDE S-4, Major Kevin Pilgrim. Through his personal efforts, MAJ Pilgrim made certain the BDE completed all of the appropriate shipping forms, coordinated the movement control and other actions that ensured a smooth transition from Gelnhausen to Saudi Arabia. The 2nd BDE was the first 3AD unit to deploy to Desert Shield and as such, experienced many of the difficulties associated with support systems that were not yet prepared to receive or handle the requirement. Nevertheless, the main body of soldiers began deployment on 26 December 1990. Some of the BDE habitually associated assets did not deploy as part of the 2nd BDE TF (notably the engineer and ADA assets). The BDE vehicles were marshaled and transported to the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, Holland on or about 8 December 1990 for ship movement to Saudi Arabia.

On 26 December 1990 the main body of the BDE began assembling at Al Khobar Village in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, a.k.a. ‘MGM Grand Hotel.’ The BDE vehicles arrived over a six week period beginning about 26 December 1990.

In early January, around the 6th or 7th, the BDE received the 3AD Operational Plan (OPLAN) named ‘Desert Spear.’ The plan called for a six phased operation.
Phase I: The preparation activities in Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Henry.
Phase II: Coincided with the start of the Air Campaign and required the movement of BDE forces to occupy Forward Assembly Area (FAA) Butts.
Phase III: The movement of 3AD from FAA Butts through the breach of the Saudi-Iraqi border.
Phase IV: The securing and consolidation on Objective (OBJ) Collins.
Phase V: The destruction of the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC).
Phase VI: The defense of northern Kuwait and further actions to be planned.

The plan required movement keyed on the determination of G-Day, the proposed date beginning ground combat operations, in support of a VII Corps deception plan. The VII Corps deception plan prohibited movement west of the Wadi al Batin so as to deceive the enemy of the true location of the VII Corps units and hence, the locations of a ground attack main effort. The 2nd BDE supported the deception plan by restricting movement to and reconnaissance of FAA Butts. This required a plan to occupy FAA Butts based on a map reconnaissance and one engineer recon led by the BDE Engineer, Major Doug Yates.

The initial Operation Desert Storm timeline called for a 14 to 30 day Air War keyed to the destruction of 50% of the RGFC combat power. The Air War was to begin on 16 January 1991. The 2nd BDE activities were oriented towards the conduct of training for combat at the Platoon, Company/Battery level, gunnery at the Crew and Platoon level, rehearsals from attack plans at the Battalion (BN), Brigade (BDE) and Division (DIV) level as well as refinement of the plan.

The BDE occupied TAA Henry using a company fire support base concept, oriented for all around defense. This concept was designed to allow the BDE to defend in a dispersed fashion, yet be close enough to reinforce each other should the need arise. All unit vehicle positions, fighting positions and sleeping positions were dug into the terrain. All vehicle and command structures were covered with camouflage netting not only to disguise individual assets, but to lower the silhouettes of vehicles, fighting positions and troops at night. This set the tone early for the BDE and also provided protection against a possible Iraqi ground attack or SCUD missile attack.

Daily activities for units included 0600 and 1800 staff updates to the BDE Commander, Colonel Robert W. Higgins, unit stand-to operations at 0500, coordinated staff and command actions as well as unit training activities. The ration cycle was generally ‘A’ rations (fresh ingredients) or ‘B’ rations (dehydrated, reconstituted, prepackaged) for breakfast and dinner with a MRE (Meal Ready to Eat) for lunch.

At the BDE level, the activities of the Air Campaign of Operation Desert Storm were almost unnoticeable as our deception locations were 90km from the border. Apart from occasional flashes of light from B-52 bombing sorties, war time activities were unobserved. However, the BDE staff spent much time and effort tracking the movement and battle damage assessment of the Air Campaign effects on the RGFC and other front line Iraqi units. These efforts proved valuable once the BDE made contact with enemy forces: BDE staff were able to accurately template enemy forces the BDE faced in battle.

At the Battalion (BN) level, Gunnery exercises required that the BDE create tank ranges in the desert with little material and a lot of imagination. A great deal of the BDE Commander’s time was spent emphasizing the construction of these tank ranges and firing a modified Tank Table XII.